Jonathan Haidt is a moral psychologist who teaches at New
York University. In his 2012 book The
Righteous Mind, he proposes a model for understanding people's moral intuitions called Moral Foundations Theory.
Haidt adapts the concept of cognitive modules proposed by
cognitive anthropologists. Cognitive modules are neural pathways with which the
brain is prewired, and which respond to patterns detected by the senses. For
example, Dan Sperber and Lawrence Hirschfield have proposed that people possess
a snake-detector module. Our brains appear to be prewired to produce a fear
response as soon as we see a snake whether or not we have been taught to fear
snakes, and whether or not we have ever seen a snake. (144)
Haidt and his colleague Joseph Craig borrow this idea of
modularity and propose that humans have six moral intuition modules. Haidt
calls these modules “moral foundations,” and this is why the theory is known as
Moral Foundations Theory. The six modules are Caring/harm, Fairness/cheating,
Loyalty/betrayal, Authority/subversion, Sanctity/degradation, and
Liberty/oppression. (146, 197)
To demonstrate how Moral Foundations Theory works, Haidt
asks the reader to imagine their child undergoing surgery. The idea of a sharp
implement piercing your child is obviously disturbing even if you understand
that the procedure is for your child’s benefit. If you imagine morality to be
based on reason, then it makes no sense for you to turn away. But if your moral
intuitions are reflexive responses to particularly stimuli, then the compulsion
to look away during the surgery despite your knowledge that the surgery is
beneficial makes perfect sense. Similarly, Haidt asks you to imagine that one
of the nurses assisting in the surgery strokes your child’s head while they
undergo the surgery. Would you not be comforted by this act even if it were the
case that your son was entirely oblivious to this action? And if there were two
nurses assisting in the surgery, and both were equally competent, would you not
prefer the nurse that stroked your child’s head despite this act being of no
consequence to the outcome of the surgery or even your child’s comfort during
the surgery? Haidt argues that there is no rational reason to view the nurse’s
action as a “good” act, but we would all intuitively feel that it is. Again,
Haidt argues, this makes perfect sense if our emotions are simply intuitions
triggered by particular stimuli. (147-8)
For Haidt, we all have six moral intuition modules, but
the content of those intuitions varies. Our Care/harm moral intuition might
extent to only our family. Or it might extend to our tribe, not beyond that. Or
perhaps only to our nation, but not foreigners. We have the same innate
capacity for empathy, but we do not innately extend it to the same universe of
people.
What determines the content of our moral intuition
modules? First, there are genetic differences between people that either
increase or decrease the degree to which they lean on certain modules. For
instance, some genes make novel experiences more pleasurable. Such a person
would have less need for order and structure and would therefore be less
inclined to highly value submission to authority. In addition, elements of our
personality are developed in response to our environment. If we attend a
rigidly structured school that causes us to disengage, disengagement might
become a personality trait. Adding to this variation are differences in our
experiences. One person might choose to regularly attend church, whereas
another might not. Such differences in experience can potentially enhance
differences in the content of moral intuitions. (322-28)
Haidt believes that political divisions within society
can be explained in part by difference in the degree to which any particular
moral intuition module is active for a given political grouping. Educated Westerners such
as professors and university students tend to be highly motivated by the
Care/harm, Fairness/cheating, and the Liberty/oppression foundations. Such
people are liberals in the context of American politics. For example, they
might have bumper stickers expressing solidarity with distant people whom they
have never met, such as the victims of the Darfur genocide. (156-7) If educated
Westerners feel any sense of sanctity, it is less likely to have to do with
religion than with civil rights leaders, for instance. (123)
However, educated Westerners are both globally and
historically unique. Much of Haidt’s research is based on surveys, and he
recounts how working class people just down the road from his university
responded drastically differently than his colleagues and students to his
survey questions. (111) Some psychologists apparently now use the acronym WEIRD
to refer to cultures that are Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and
democratic. They do so to highlight that such cultures “are the least typical,
least representative people you could study if you want to make generalizations
about human nature.” (112) Furthermore, Americans are WEIRDer than Europeans,
and the best educated Americans the WEIRDest of all. Haidt concludes that this
is because “Liberals have a three-foundation morality, whereas conservatives
use all six.” (214) Most people globally and historically have apparently made
greater use of all six moral intuition modules.
Haidt believes that our moral matrices have blind spots.
For instance, Haidt writes that in the 1960s liberals pushed for programs that
supported the poor but which undermined institutions such as the family. Driven
by a strong moral intuition about the need to provide care, but lacking
significant concern for loyalty, authority, and sanctity, liberals harmed those
they sought to help. Haidt seems to imply that if liberals had taken social
conservative arguments more seriously, welfare programs might have been crafted
in such a way as to mitigate these harms. (356-62)
Haidt wants his readers to consider their moral matrices’
blind spots and to consider the virtues of other moral intuition modules. He
therefore spends about twenty pages describing the virtues of various political
persuasions. Liberals are correct in that regulation is sometimes beneficial.
Libertarians are right that markets promote innovation. Etc. Perhaps, he
writes, “…public policy might really be improved by drawing on insights from
all sides.” Indeed, he thinks liberals and conservatives are the complimentary
yin and yang of a well-functioning society. (343-4)
On the one hand, I certainly endorse the proposal that we
strive to overcome our tribalism. As Sam Harris has pointed out, the fact that
one’s position on abortion is predictive of their position on gun control is a
problem. Issues such as these are not sufficiently related to justify an almost
certain correlation between them. There is no obvious reason why someone could
not be opposed to abortion but in favor of strict gun control. Therefore, if we
are able to predict someone’s position on the one issue by knowing their
position on the other, it suggests that we are not thinking critically for
ourselves but simply adopting positions taken by our tribe.
On the other hand, maybe there’s a good reason that the
best educated people in human history have unique attitudes about morality. And
perhaps if we crafted public policy that drew “on insights from all sides” we would merely dilute the moral intuitions of people who have most escaped our worst
impulses to exclude and oppress.
Whether one buys that or not, Haidt’s prescriptions have
only a tenuous connection to his descriptions. Just as individuals and groups
have blind spots in all other realms, we have blind spots when it comes to
morality. And such blind spots can be compensated for by a diversity of
perspectives. However, as I think he would agree, there is nothing about his
descriptive taxonomy of moral intuition modules that closes the door on the
possibility that some groups really are, to put it bluntly, morally superior to
others.
Haidt, Jonathan. The
Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion. New
York: Vintage Books, 2012.
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