The following is a summary of Richard Evans' brief discussion of Otto von Bismarck in The Coming of the Third Reich.
For Richard Evans, it is in the period of unification under Bismarck in 1871 "that we find the first real moment in German history which it is possible to relate directly to the coming of the Third Reich in 1933." Bismarck is a "key figure" in the history of Nazi Germany because it was his myth that inspired in Germans of the interwar period a longing "for the return of the strong leadership his name represented" and because Bismarck helped create "an ominous legacy for the German future." (2)
Of Bismarck himself Evans writes that he "made his reputation as the wild man of German conservatism, given to brutal statements and violent actions...". (2) Once Bismarck had left the political scene, "the myth emerged...of Bismarck himself as a charismatic leader who had ruthlessly cut the Gordian knots of politics and solved the great questions of the day by force. It was Bismarck's revolutionary wars in the 1860s that remained in the German public memory, not the two subsequent decades in which he tried to maintain the peace in Europe in order to allow the German Reich to find its feet." (12) As indicated, "Bismarck was a far more complex character" than his later myth suggested. "He was not the reckless, risk-taking gambler of later legend." It was Bismarck who famously defined politics as "the art of the possible." (3)
There was of course some truth to the myth. Bismarck emerges onto the pages of history books as the man who united Germany in 1871. He did this by waging wars during the 1860s funded by taxes raised without the consent of the legislature, which was apparently supposed to wield authority over taxation. (5-6) After having united Germany, Bismarck declared a new "German Reich". The use of the word "Reich"--German for empire--was an indication of the grandeur of Germany's ambitions and the belligerence of its nationalism. The term brought to mind Charlemagne's Holy Roman Reich of the German Nation which had united--tenuously, it seems--Central Europe from the year 800 to the year 1806, when it was shattered by Napoleon. (3-4, 6-7) The term also portended and perhaps contributed to inspiring Germany's attempts to bring under German control those parts of Europe with large numbers of ethnic Germans, such as Austria and the Czech Sudetenland.
The constitution Bismarck promulgated for this "Second Reich" was far from democratic. At the head of government was a monarch, the Kaiser. The Kaiser appointed the civilian administration, administered the army, and held the power to declare war or peace. A national parliament--the Reichstag--was created. Evans does not enumerate its powers and they seem to have paled relative to the powers of the Kaiser and his appointed administration. (7)
The head of the civilian administration was the Reich Chancellor. Bismarck himself held this office from 1871 to 1890. Evans discusses at least three features of his legacy that are relevant to the advent of Nazism.
The first was the preeminence of militarism in German society. Indeed, Bismarck's domination of German politics had begun in 1862 with his appointment by the king to thwart the legislature's attempt to bring the military under it's control. (5, 8) He was successful. The legislature seems to have had virtually no control over the administration of the army. "Bismarck saw to it that the army was virtually a state within a state." (9)
Officers expected deference from civilians and "it was the ambition of many a bourgeois professional to be admitted as an officer in the army reserve...". (9) Military service was compulsory, militarism thus presumably permeating society. In addition, those who volunteered for extended periods of service "had an automatic right to a job in state employment when they finally left the army." (9) Therefore "the vast majority of policemen, postmen, railwaymen and other lower servants of the state were ex-soldiers, who had been socialized in the army and behaved in the military fashion to which they had become accustomed." (9)
Evans briefly discusses German overseas imperialism. It was evidently only following its unification in 1871 that Germany engaged in the imperialistic policies that the rest of Europe had long been engaged in. Evans writes that, "military arrogance was strengthened by the colonial experience...". (12)
Another legacy of Bismarck's was the consequences of the "struggle for culture" that he initiated. This phrase refers to his efforts to bring the Catholic Church under the control of the state. This involved requiring clergy to "undergo training at state institutions and submit clerical appointments to state approval." (13) "The struggle eventually died down" Evans writes. But it left "the Catholic community an embittered enemy of liberalism and modernity", German liberalism having endorsed what they themselves had "dubbed" the "struggle for culture". In order to defend themselves Catholics had formed the Centre Party. So the Catholic Centre Party itself was one legacy of Bismarck's reign. In addition, as a consequence of persecution, German Catholicism was "determined to prove its loyalty to the state...". (13-14)
The third major legacy of Bismarck's that Evans discusses is the long-term consequences of his 1878 Anti-Socialist Law, enacted under the pretext of a response to two assassination attempts on the Kaiser, of which Evans writes, "Germany's fledgling socialist movement had nothing to do with...". "Socialist meetings were banned, socialist newspapers and magazines suppressed, the socialist party outlawed." (14) German liberals endorsed this repression as well.
Socialist candidates were still able to run as individuals in elections. Thus, despite the Anti-Socialist Law, "as Germany's industrialization gathered pace and the industrial working class increased ever more rapidly in numbers, so socialist candidates won an ever-growing share of the vote." The law lapsed in 1890 (and Bismarck left the political scene in that year), and by WWI the German Social Democratic Party was "the largest political organization anywhere in the world." (14)
The consequences of Bismarck's repression of socialists, and liberals' support for it, were seemingly contradictory. "The repression of the Anti-Socialist Law had driven [the party] to the left...". All of Germany's current institutions were to be overthrown in a revolution of the proletariat which would establish a socialist republic. They would have no truck with mere reform, and a "deep gulf opened up between the Social Democrats on the one hand and all the 'bourgeois' parties on the other." (14-15)
Yet, "the party was determined to do everything it could to remain within the law and not to provide any excuse for the oft-threatened reintroduction of a banning order." Remaining within the law was difficult since "[p]etty chicanery by the police was backed up by conservative judges and prosecutors, and by courts that continued to regard the Social Democrats as dangerous revolutionaries." For many of these people, "the law's purpose was to uphold the existing institutions of state and society, not to act as a neutral referee between opposing political groups." Perhaps the party's acquired "habit of waiting for things to happen, rather than acting to bring them about" was rooted in the "set of vested interests" provided by the party's "massively elaborate institutional structure" which "came in time to provide a whole way of life for its members...". This might explain the seeming contradiction of rejecting the legitimacy of a society's institutions but then struggling to abide by its laws. (15)
For Richard Evans, it is in the period of unification under Bismarck in 1871 "that we find the first real moment in German history which it is possible to relate directly to the coming of the Third Reich in 1933." Bismarck is a "key figure" in the history of Nazi Germany because it was his myth that inspired in Germans of the interwar period a longing "for the return of the strong leadership his name represented" and because Bismarck helped create "an ominous legacy for the German future." (2)
Of Bismarck himself Evans writes that he "made his reputation as the wild man of German conservatism, given to brutal statements and violent actions...". (2) Once Bismarck had left the political scene, "the myth emerged...of Bismarck himself as a charismatic leader who had ruthlessly cut the Gordian knots of politics and solved the great questions of the day by force. It was Bismarck's revolutionary wars in the 1860s that remained in the German public memory, not the two subsequent decades in which he tried to maintain the peace in Europe in order to allow the German Reich to find its feet." (12) As indicated, "Bismarck was a far more complex character" than his later myth suggested. "He was not the reckless, risk-taking gambler of later legend." It was Bismarck who famously defined politics as "the art of the possible." (3)
There was of course some truth to the myth. Bismarck emerges onto the pages of history books as the man who united Germany in 1871. He did this by waging wars during the 1860s funded by taxes raised without the consent of the legislature, which was apparently supposed to wield authority over taxation. (5-6) After having united Germany, Bismarck declared a new "German Reich". The use of the word "Reich"--German for empire--was an indication of the grandeur of Germany's ambitions and the belligerence of its nationalism. The term brought to mind Charlemagne's Holy Roman Reich of the German Nation which had united--tenuously, it seems--Central Europe from the year 800 to the year 1806, when it was shattered by Napoleon. (3-4, 6-7) The term also portended and perhaps contributed to inspiring Germany's attempts to bring under German control those parts of Europe with large numbers of ethnic Germans, such as Austria and the Czech Sudetenland.
The constitution Bismarck promulgated for this "Second Reich" was far from democratic. At the head of government was a monarch, the Kaiser. The Kaiser appointed the civilian administration, administered the army, and held the power to declare war or peace. A national parliament--the Reichstag--was created. Evans does not enumerate its powers and they seem to have paled relative to the powers of the Kaiser and his appointed administration. (7)
The head of the civilian administration was the Reich Chancellor. Bismarck himself held this office from 1871 to 1890. Evans discusses at least three features of his legacy that are relevant to the advent of Nazism.
The first was the preeminence of militarism in German society. Indeed, Bismarck's domination of German politics had begun in 1862 with his appointment by the king to thwart the legislature's attempt to bring the military under it's control. (5, 8) He was successful. The legislature seems to have had virtually no control over the administration of the army. "Bismarck saw to it that the army was virtually a state within a state." (9)
Officers expected deference from civilians and "it was the ambition of many a bourgeois professional to be admitted as an officer in the army reserve...". (9) Military service was compulsory, militarism thus presumably permeating society. In addition, those who volunteered for extended periods of service "had an automatic right to a job in state employment when they finally left the army." (9) Therefore "the vast majority of policemen, postmen, railwaymen and other lower servants of the state were ex-soldiers, who had been socialized in the army and behaved in the military fashion to which they had become accustomed." (9)
Evans briefly discusses German overseas imperialism. It was evidently only following its unification in 1871 that Germany engaged in the imperialistic policies that the rest of Europe had long been engaged in. Evans writes that, "military arrogance was strengthened by the colonial experience...". (12)
Another legacy of Bismarck's was the consequences of the "struggle for culture" that he initiated. This phrase refers to his efforts to bring the Catholic Church under the control of the state. This involved requiring clergy to "undergo training at state institutions and submit clerical appointments to state approval." (13) "The struggle eventually died down" Evans writes. But it left "the Catholic community an embittered enemy of liberalism and modernity", German liberalism having endorsed what they themselves had "dubbed" the "struggle for culture". In order to defend themselves Catholics had formed the Centre Party. So the Catholic Centre Party itself was one legacy of Bismarck's reign. In addition, as a consequence of persecution, German Catholicism was "determined to prove its loyalty to the state...". (13-14)
The third major legacy of Bismarck's that Evans discusses is the long-term consequences of his 1878 Anti-Socialist Law, enacted under the pretext of a response to two assassination attempts on the Kaiser, of which Evans writes, "Germany's fledgling socialist movement had nothing to do with...". "Socialist meetings were banned, socialist newspapers and magazines suppressed, the socialist party outlawed." (14) German liberals endorsed this repression as well.
Socialist candidates were still able to run as individuals in elections. Thus, despite the Anti-Socialist Law, "as Germany's industrialization gathered pace and the industrial working class increased ever more rapidly in numbers, so socialist candidates won an ever-growing share of the vote." The law lapsed in 1890 (and Bismarck left the political scene in that year), and by WWI the German Social Democratic Party was "the largest political organization anywhere in the world." (14)
The consequences of Bismarck's repression of socialists, and liberals' support for it, were seemingly contradictory. "The repression of the Anti-Socialist Law had driven [the party] to the left...". All of Germany's current institutions were to be overthrown in a revolution of the proletariat which would establish a socialist republic. They would have no truck with mere reform, and a "deep gulf opened up between the Social Democrats on the one hand and all the 'bourgeois' parties on the other." (14-15)
Yet, "the party was determined to do everything it could to remain within the law and not to provide any excuse for the oft-threatened reintroduction of a banning order." Remaining within the law was difficult since "[p]etty chicanery by the police was backed up by conservative judges and prosecutors, and by courts that continued to regard the Social Democrats as dangerous revolutionaries." For many of these people, "the law's purpose was to uphold the existing institutions of state and society, not to act as a neutral referee between opposing political groups." Perhaps the party's acquired "habit of waiting for things to happen, rather than acting to bring them about" was rooted in the "set of vested interests" provided by the party's "massively elaborate institutional structure" which "came in time to provide a whole way of life for its members...". This might explain the seeming contradiction of rejecting the legitimacy of a society's institutions but then struggling to abide by its laws. (15)
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